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I. INTRODUCTION
Although politics and ideology long have played a role in federal
judicial appointment and elevation,1 that role has swelled in recent
years. Ongoing Senate confirmation battles over federal court nominees and rampant speculation about potential retirements from the
Rehnquist Court have morphed into mainstream news. One critique
of this ongoing fascination with the appointment process is that it is
fundamentally out of focus. The contemporary debate centers on predicting how a putative Justice might (or might not) tip the balance on
hotbed political issues rather than on merit or qualification for judicial service. Consequently, the debate says very little about how
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Adjunct Professor of
Law, Boston College Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law. B.A., Harvard College, 1955; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1958.
1. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (observing that despite the curiosity that “every generation
has the sense that it is the first to uncover that ideology has a role in the judicial selection
process,” in fact, “[e]very President in American history, to a greater or lesser extent, has
chosen federal judges, in part, based on their ideology”).
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those dimensions might be measured. Traditionally, the American
Bar Association has produced a qualitative measure of merit (which
it provides to the President, the Attorney General, and the Senate
Judiciary Committee) that evaluates the integrity, professional competence, and judicial temperament of each federal judicial nominee
and designates each nominee as well qualified, qualified, or not
qualified.2 This system, though valuable in some aspects, has limited
utility because its “thumbs-up/thumbs-down” approach provides
meager information about the relative merits of the nominees. Moreover, its legitimacy as a nonpartisan measure has come under attack
by researchers who suggest that it could be a disguised political device.3
Two academics, Professors Choi and Gulati, have reacted to the
perceived hyperpoliticization of the federal judicial appointment and
elevation processes by calling for the development of “objective”
measures for evaluating judicial talent. To this end, Professors Choi
and Gulati have put forth a particularly provocative proposal for a
“Tournament of Judges” (the “Tournament”)—an ongoing empirical
contest among federal appellate judges that would purport to tabulate objective measures of judicial performance (such as opinion publication rates, citation rates, and frequency of dissent) and would
rank judges according to their overall scores.4 In the authors’ construct, the highest-ranked judge would be offered up as the heir apparent to the next Supreme Court vacancy.5 Choi and Gulati apparently believe that their Tournament will produce one of two desirable
results: either politics will take a back seat to merit or, failing that, a
politically motivated nomination will no longer be able to masquerade as merit-based.6 Even short of Supreme Court appointment, they
posit, the Tournament would infuse the federal appellate bench with
an “otherwise absent external incentive” for excellence in performance.7 A ranking system would hold judges accountable to high per-

2. A M . B AR A SS ’ N , S TANDING C OMMITTEE ON F EDERAL J UDICIARY : W HAT I T I S
H OW I T W ORKS 1 n.1, 3, 8 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/
Federal_Judiciary%20(2).pdf. The ABA Standing Committee’s ratings on judicial
nominees can be accessed at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings.html.
3. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of
Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1, 6
(2001) (asserting that “[e]xtensive data analysis [of the ABA ratings] revealed different
patterns for evaluating Clinton and Bush appointees”).
4. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 303
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament].
5. See id. For a follow-up article in which the Tournament’s architects run the numbers to show how such a competition would operate, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking].
6. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 301.
7. Id. at 304.
AND
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formance standards because the potential reward of elevation and
the reputational benefits of superstar status would motivate them to
excel.8 Conversely, the risks of decreased peer respect and public embarrassment would ensure good work even from those judges who
have no realistic prospect of elevation or who are indifferent to judicial celebrity.
On the surface, these dual objectives—merit-based elevation and
increased incentive to perform—may have a patina of plausibility.
But there is more here than meets the eye. This Essay examines
whether these objectives are worth pursuing in the abstract and then
considers whether objective measures are likely to produce the results bruited by the sponsors of the Tournament.9
II. OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF MERIT AND THE SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT PROCESS
In the abstract, the task of developing objective measures of judicial performance seems straightforward. Achieving objective measures would assist in the selection of Supreme Court Justices both by
providing standardized information about merit—valuable in itself
for identifying the best candidates—and by gleaning the extent to
which ideological alignment, diversity concerns, or other non-meritbased factors might drive a particular process of nomination and confirmation. It is, however, instructive to peek beneath the coverlet.
A. Do We Need Objective Measures of Merit to Identify the Most
Qualified Candidates?
The primary function of objective measurement systems (such as
the proposed Tournament) is to provide a standardized set of data in
order to foster informed decisionmaking. The assumption underlying
the perceived need for such data is that the informal, ad hoc methods
currently employed to determine which candidates make the final cut
are somehow deficient or that they lead to bad results. That assumption is somewhat puzzling. Although the existing process may be discursive and sometimes opaque, no one has made the case that it produces disagreeable outcomes (that is, that it results generally in the
appointment or elevation of unqualified jurists). By any reasonable
measure, the Article III judiciary comprises an array of talented men
and women. This can only mean that there is an underlying meritbased quality control system at work. This system operates effectively, if somewhat obscurely, to ensure that, politics aside, success8. Id.
9. Though I focus on the Choi/Gulati proposal, I take that proposal to be representative of a broader bid to introduce empirical measures of judicial performance into the federal judicial system.
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ful candidates have passed a certain threshold of merit. Thus, the
real impetus behind objective measures cannot merely be a desire to
ensure that candidates are qualified.
In fact, the absence of debate about the merits of nominees quite
likely indicates that an informal but highly merit-conscious system of
preliminary screening is already in place. To illustrate their point
that decisionmakers eschew merit-based discussion, Choi and Gulati
point to examples of political opponents talking past one another
(such as the situation in which a proponent of a candidate asserts
that the candidate is highly qualified and, instead of challenging that
assertion head-on, the opponent responds with her ideological objections to the candidate’s elevation).10
This claim that politics too often drowns out the merits fails to acknowledge that Presidents rarely submit nominees who would not
fare well under an objective ranking system and that, as a result of
that preliminary vetting, most nominees who come before the Senate
easily meet or exceed any reasonable set of merit-based benchmarks.
Were a candidate’s qualifications miserable or even comparatively
underwhelming, one would expect the candidate’s foes to pounce on
the fact of mediocrity rather than to engage in ideological polemics.
In most cases, however, the fact of nomination is shorthand for the
achievement of a behind-the-scenes consensus about objective qualification, such that public debate shifts almost immediately to more
contentious issues.
Indeed, structural pressures all but guarantee that a President
will nominate candidates who are highly qualified in terms of intelligence, experience, and skill. By vesting the nomination power solely
in the hands of the President,11 the Constitution concentrates accountability in a single individual. The caliber of the nominees will
reflect directly upon the President. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist No. 76 that “[t]he sole and undivided responsibility of [the
President] will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more
exact regard to reputation. [The President] will, on this account, feel
himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled
. . . .”12 In contrasting presidential appointment with the alternative
of appointment by a multimember assembly, Hamilton observed that
in the latter case “the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight.”13
10. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 26 & n.3, 27; Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 321 & n.55.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Modern Library ed.
1937).
13. Id. at 493.
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Nor is there a mandate or even an implicit norm that requires a
President to offer seats on the Supreme Court as a reward for being
the best in terms of intelligence, skill, or service on a lower court.
Therefore, respect for the nominating power and regard for the many
nuanced components that enter into the selection process counsel
against lodging merit-based objections unless a particular nominee is
in fact poorly qualified. Merit operates only as a threshold, not as the
ultimate determinant. One can argue for increasing the height of the
threshold limit, but even if that is done, there still will remain a
group of aspirants who can exceed it. It is nothing short of utopian to
think there will be only one.
In sum, for all that can be said about the lack of mainstream discussion of merit, there exists no plausible basis for a substantiated
claim that the present process fails to yield top-notch Justices. If an
objective measurement system is redundant because it identifies
roughly the same pool of candidates that historically have been considered and chosen, there will be very little tolerance for any costs
that such an innovation imposes. The question, then, is whether the
game is worth the candle.
B. Do Objective Measures of Merit Serve the Goal of Political
Transparency?
The idea of developing objective measures of merit to direct Supreme Court appointment grows out of a desire to reduce the politicization that has increasingly plagued the process of nominating and
confirming appeals court judges (and that threatens to embroil future Supreme Court nominees). This is a matter of preference, not of
constitutional mandate. The Constitution assigns the responsibility
of choosing Supreme Court Justices to the political branches of the
federal government,14 and therefore it is unsurprising that ideology
factors into the exercise of the nomination and confirmation powers.
As a normative matter, that is as it should be.15 Even assuming that
the extirpation of politics from the nomination and confirmation processes is a goal supportable on other grounds—and that is a
stretch—I have no faith that any system of rankings would achieve
it. From my perspective, political transparency—and not some false
promise of liberation from politics—is the touchstone in considering
the value of objective measures.
Seen in this light, the argument for the use of objective measures
is that while we may not be able to eliminate the politics, we can at
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 628 (arguing that “ideology should be considered because the judicial selection process is the key majoritarian check on an antimajoritarian institution”).
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least unmask the political subtexts that underlie conflicting claims
that a particular aspirant is either an intellectual giant or an intellectual pygmy of the kind whom we consider to be qualified/not qualified to serve on the Supreme Court. The example that Choi and Gulati offer is a presidential nominee who ranks forty-second out of 160
active circuit court judges on the merit-based scale.16 In that situation, they assert, a neutral observer can conclude that some factor
other than objective merit (say, ideology) is driving the selection.17
That is hardly rocket science. Yet another equally likely scenario
demonstrates how a ranking system may serve to provide an impenetrable cover for an essentially ideological choice. While a President
may have some explaining to do if he nominates number forty-two,
he will escape the burden of revealing his calculus if he picks a candidate from the top tier (say, from the fifteen top-ranked circuit
judges), regardless of whether he bases that selection on the candidate’s ideological alignment. In that way, a President will be able to
hide behind the very metric that the Tournament’s advocates have
intended as a means of making his motivations transparent. Although Choi and Gulati submit that the “introduction of a norm to
apply objective criteria will force politicians to provide more justification for their selection,”18 it may very well accomplish exactly the opposite result.
The likely proliferation of multiple “objective” metrics also may
undermine the goal of political transparency. Merit, like beauty, often lies in the eye of the beholder. If decisionmakers do come to rely
on a merit-based ranking system, the lure of potential influence on
the appointment process doubtless will spawn a market of competing
objective indices, each claiming greater accuracy. Savants, docents,
and other interested parties will lose little time in developing formulas designed to reach particular results. Consequently, any ranking
system will face constant criticism that it is a proxy for either political affiliation or ideological leanings rather than for merit. I fear that
the jousting between warring indices would repoliticize the selection
process at a level even further removed from the relative qualifications of judicial aspirants. The goal of political transparency will not
be served by a band of cleverly designed ranking systems that merely
masquerade as objective measures.

16. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 28.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 30.
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C. Are Objective Measures of Judicial Performance Apt Indicators of
Qualification to Serve on the Court?
Even if one assumes that, in the abstract, an objective ranking
system could assist in the selection of candidates for the Supreme
Court and could improve the political transparency of the process,
the fact remains that a ranking system is only as effective as its
component criteria. Choi and Gulati posit that judicial merit can be
measured by a composite of “productivity,” “quality,” and “independence.”19 To measure productivity, they factor in the number of majority and dissenting opinions a judge has written and the number of
cases in which the judge has participated.20 To gauge quality, they
seize on what they believe to be an already accessible market test for
that attribute: looking at how often and how prominently a judge’s
opinions are cited by other courts and academics.21 Finally, to gauge
judicial independence, they reason that disagreement, particularly
opposition to the opinion of a colleague appointed by a President of
the same party, indicates that the judge has a mind of her own, and
thus dissent rates constitute a valid proxy for this attribute.22
While there is arguably some relationship between these three indices and judicial merit, I doubt that the correlation is close enough
to justify placing much weight on a composite ranking, let alone to
justify using such a ranking as the primary filter for narrowing the
field of candidates for elevation.23 My concerns fall into two general
categories. First, I sense a series of disjunctures between the stated
criteria and the concept of judicial merit. Second, even if the proxies
were acceptable, they would be inherently manipulable by the contestants. I consider each index in turn.
1. The Productivity Index
In evaluating the productivity index, my immediate concern is
that this measure is underinclusive because it ignores a range of appellate activities. Though writing opinions is the primary work of the
appellate judge, that activity captures only part of the occupation. In
19. Id. at 42 (defining the terms productivity, quality, and independence for the purposes of their article).
20. For a more detailed description of this methodology, see id. at 42-47.
21. Id. at 48.
22. See id. at 61-67 (explaining the methodology for calculating the independence
measure).
23. Professors Choi and Gulati readily acknowledge that the Tournament’s measures
are flawed in many ways but dismiss these defects by downplaying what is in many ways
the Tournament’s most attractive selling point—that it actually will tell us something
about merit so that we can evaluate candidates on that basis. To do this, they inch away
from the question whether the Tournament gets it right when it comes to identifying merit
and instead insist that so long as the Tournament unmasks political forces, it is a valuable
tool. See id. at 35-36.
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the interest of expediency, judges decide many cases by issuing
judgments or memorandum orders, without full-dress opinions.
Those devices are utilitarian, and their appropriate use should not be
discouraged. Judges also regularly serve on duty panels that decide
motions and other procedural matters—while it is not glamorous
work, it is, nonetheless, necessary. At the request of the President or
the Chief Justice, some judges undertake service on bodies such as
the Sentencing Commission, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and committees of the Judicial Conference. This service often limits the number
of cases that a judge hears in his own court. Finally, many judges are
forced to restrict their sitting schedules in order to carry out the administrative burdens that are essential to the operation of the federal
courts.
While the underinclusivity of the index is arguably correctable to
some extent, it highlights the ease with which one can rig a ranking
system to produce particular results by selectively including certain
factors and excluding others. Moreover, this deficiency reminds us
that ranking systems are scarcely masters of nuance; a particular
candidate will fare well only if she fits the mold that the index constructs. Designing that index is a normative task that demands some
agreement about what merit means. This enhances the likelihood
that competing versions of merit—versions that are likely inseparable in certain ways from judicial philosophy (read “ideology”)—will
produce competing indices, thereby clouding an observer’s ability to
discern merit.
My next criticism is that the productivity factor is deceptively
straightforward. By placing productivity on a pedestal, the ranking
indulges an assumption that we want Supreme Court Justices who
are docket-movers. That is a wholly untested notion of merit. Indeed,
the index assumes that those who write more slowly or less often are
inefficient, lazy, distracted, or just plain incompetent. That assumption is a canard: it unfairly demeans judges who subscribe to a philosophy of restraint or those who believe that publication for publication’s sake tends to confuse the law.24 The point is that the index has
its biases—and more troubling still, those biases may not be immediately apparent.
Manipulability is also a concern. Judges, to varying degrees, exercise control over their own numbers. If a judge wanted to increase
her productivity score, she might work harder, take more cases, and
produce more opinions. So long as this were done without sacrificing
quality, this option would bring about a higher ranking while helping
24. See Hon. Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals
Judge in the Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 407-08 (1994).
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the administration of justice. But a judge might avail herself of other
options to effect a score increase without accomplishing any systemic
gains. She could, for example, sacrifice quality for quantity, dash off
gratuitous concurrences or dissents, shy away from demanding cases
in search of easy prey, or use a host of other tactics. These myriad
opportunities for “strategic gaming” of the numbers would further
debilitate the effectiveness of the index as a proxy for merit.
Last—but far from least—there are real costs to introducing new
behavioral incentives into an institution in which justice has long
been thought the cardinal goal. Hasty and unnecessary opinions generally make for bad law, and manipulative behavior may erode both
the credibility of the system and the collegiality that is so necessary
to the effective functioning of an appellate court. The point is that
even though a productivity index may incentivize genuine improvements, there is an equal or greater risk that it will encourage behaviors inimical to the development of decisional law and to the legitimacy of the federal courts.
2. The Quality Index
The assertion that consumption indicates quality may have some
truth in it because judges and academics concerned with producing
coherent rationales are unlikely to rely on poorly reasoned ones. At
least two distortions, however, will likely interfere with the quality
signal.
The first problem with culling a quality score from citation rates
is that all citations are not created equal. A citation may signal that
the authoring judge produced an apt statement of a commonly used
standard or a path-breaking approach to a complex area of the law.
Absent a sophisticated coding system—one that would doubtless involve subjective judgments—the rankings would not record such nuances.
A second problem (and perhaps one that we should associate more
generally with all supposedly objective measures of judicial performance) arises from the fact that subsequent authors will come to rely
upon the rankings themselves, particularly the quality index, as a
shorthand for quality. This will create a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. Judges who rank high on the quality index will likely earn respect in the legal community, thereby increasing the probability that
other judges and academics will cite their opinions. Future citation
rates will then say less about the quality of a cited opinion and more
about the entrenched reputation of the original writing judge. This illustrates the Achilles’ heel of the Tournament proposal. Rankings
tend to take on a life of their own, and many people tend to rely on
them without knowing much about what they really signify. Put
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bluntly, rankings too often disengage “the thing” from “the thing signified” and thereby frustrate the objective (informed, substantive deliberation) for which they purport to supply a foundation.
Moreover, the quality index is ripe for manipulation. Any judge
worth his salt will tell you that there are ways to write opinions that
make citation more likely. Judges can boost citation rates by writing
longer opinions, publishing opinions that would otherwise go unpublished, eschewing quotations, taking controversial positions, or
reaching for novel issues at the margin of a case. Accordingly, frequency of citation sometimes may signal better strategy rather than
better quality.
3. The Independence Index
The independence index aims to capture the intellectual independence of the judge by measuring his willingness to disagree with
his colleagues.25 This is pure fiction: rates of dissent are an invalid
proxy for judicial independence. Many judges write fewer dissents
because they ascribe a relatively high value to the institutional good
of courts speaking with a single voice, and they are willing to work
toward developing a template to which the entire panel can subscribe. A low dissent rate for such a judge is a badge of honor, not of
shame. In all events, it tells us nothing about his independence.
Even if a judge’s rate of dissent provides some tiny amount of information about her independence, it is not clear that independence
in that sense is a desirable trait. After all, there plainly is a point at
which dissenters cross the line from enriching thought into either intellectual preening or obstructionist polemicism. The sponsors of this
proxy thus overlook the obvious danger in encouraging dissent for its
own sake (or more precisely, for the sake of a better independence
score).
Furthermore, Choi and Gulati have conceded that a particular
ranking system could elect to place a negative weight on dissent.26
This concession highlights another of the many points at which subjective choices—choices of judicial philosophy and ideology—make
their entry into a supposedly objective measurement system. And, finally, the likelihood of manipulability is very high. Incentivized manipulation always troubles me—but it troubles me particularly in
this context because it encourages dissent for the sake of dissent and,
in the bargain, threatens both collegiality and the clarity of the law.
The cruel irony of the independence index is that the act of measurement threatens to destroy the thing measured.

25. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 61-62.
26. Id. at 62.
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I might add that this effect is far worse than the perverse incentive that Choi and Gulati attribute to the current appointment system.27 They asseverate that judges now use voting, opinion writing,
and dissent to signal their willingness, if elevated, to pander to the
ideology of the appointing administration.28 In my experience, this
seldom occurs.
4. Recapitulation
The bottom line is that I cannot credit the claim that these three
indices constitute objective measures that aptly gauge generally accepted notions of judicial merit.29 Moreover, the costs of the Tournament proposal are yet to be calculated—and those costs must be justified against whatever meager benefits an actual Tournament might
provide. I now turn to those costs.
D. The Siphoning Effect of Employing Objective Measures of Merit
as an Initial Screen
The federal appellate judiciary is not a densely populated institution. Having narrowed their field to include only active federal appellate judges, Choi and Gulati place approximately 160 candidates in
their Tournament.30 Although they frankly acknowledge that there
are normative and historical objections to choosing such an exclusive
pool as the starting point for Supreme Court appointment31—after
all, two of the nine sitting Justices come from other venues, and Justice Souter was a sitting federal appellate judge for only a day—they
attempt a test run of the Tournament by further narrowing the sample to ninety-eight judges (eliminating latecomers and those who did
not remain active through June of 2003).32
Even more problematic than this apparent elitism is the fact that
a tournament system aggrandizes attributes on the basis of ease of
measurability rather than relevance to what really makes an ideal
Supreme Court Justice.33 Other dimensions, such as temperament,
integrity, and worldliness, are left by the wayside.34 Unless one actu27. See id. at 34.
28. See id. The authors concede that the threat of nomination blocking provides a
check on overly explicit signaling; they contend, however, that judges engage in “stealth
signal[ing]” to avoid proclaiming ideology so strongly that opinions and dissents arouse the
other side to “muster its resources to block [the candidate].” Id.
29. Choi and Gulati have conceded that an actual Tournament system would not provide a perfect or even a nearly perfect measure of judicial merit. See, e.g., id. at 35-36; Choi
& Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 312.
30. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 28.
31. See id. at 40; Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 318-19.
32. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 40-41.
33. See id. at 35-36.
34. See id.
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ally values publication, citation, and dissent rates as the most exalted of all attributes—and I doubt that any of us who are not braindead would commit to that proposition—one must acknowledge that
a tournament system may skip over candidates who, considered holistically, are the most desirable.
In sum, the Tournament proposal aims to circumscribe the field of
candidates and even to limit the bounds of discourse based on a bobtailed version of merit. Self-imposed restraints of this order require
heightened justification, and it does not seem to me that the elucidation of the role of politics in the selection process is sufficiently important to warrant an artificial scheme that uses a three-attribute
measure of merit to tip the selection scales in favor of particular candidates. I do not place such great faith in these objective indices, nor
have I discovered in the Tournament proposal any sustainable normative argument that rates of publication, citation, and dissent are
the most important attributes of a Supreme Court Justice.
III. THE EFFECTS OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF MERIT ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY
Having explored the implications of employing objective measures
of merit in the Supreme Court selection process, I now turn to a secondary consequence of a selection system that relies heavily on such
measures: the incentive effect, that is, the influence that the ongoing
operation of a ranking system that holds itself out to be merit-based
will have on the everyday performance of the federal appellate judiciary. Choi and Gulati posit that promotional and reputational motivations will compel judges to modify their behavior in response to a
ranking system.35 They find this result to be desirable because they
believe that the Tournament identifies excellence, and therefore the
incentive to score high in the Tournament will extract optimal performance from federal judges.36 I cannot quarrel with their assumption that judges will react to publication of these statistics. I am less
comfortable, however, with the premise that these incentives will
produce a better, fairer, and more efficient judicial system. In a democracy that relies heavily on a system of checks and balances, more
accountability is generally welcomed. But the Tournament imposes
accountability for the wrong actions—like a failed health care system
that compensates physicians for cloning things but not for taking
care of patients. It also threatens the judicial independence that, under our system of government, is constitutionally guaranteed. Thus,

35. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 4, at 300, 313-14.
36. See id. at 304.
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the Tournament’s avowed mission to remedy “the lack of incentive to
seek promotion”37 invites scrutiny.
I begin with a brief review of the mechanism by which Choi and
Gulati anticipate this transformation will occur. The basic idea is
that federal appellate judges—on the whole, a group of high achievers (and, thus, competitive)—will conform their behavior to the criteria used in the Tournament in pursuit of promotion (or at least the
bragging rights that accompany a favorable ranking).38 The public, in
turn, will benefit from the amount of attention and care the judges
devote to the measured tasks. Even if we set aside all questions pertaining to (1) the competitiveness of judges and (2) the relationship
between the proposed criteria and the development of admirable judicial traits, there remains the question whether the promised result
justifies the introduction of an external pressure on judicial decisionmaking.
Choi and Gulati exert little effort in addressing the implications of
an incentive system for judicial independence. They write:
Whatever other objections exist, the one that we do not see room
for is the argument that the tournament would hurt judicial independence. If anything, the pressures that appellate judges may
currently feel to attract political sponsors by making decisions that
please those sponsors would be eliminated. Indeed, if there is an
objection to our system at all, it is that judges will be made too independent under it. The tournament will thus have eliminated one
of the few popular checks on an otherwise independent judiciary.39

This is more a distraction than an answer to the question. Among
other things, it disparages the emphasis that the Founders placed on
the independence of the judiciary.40 The Federalist No. 78 heralds the
“independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the
faithful performance of so arduous a duty.”41 This spirit is embodied
in Article III’s tripartite guarantee of independence, which comprises
lifetime appointment, undiminished compensation, and exclusive
vesting of the judicial power of the United States.42
Despite their importunings to the contrary, Choi and Gulati’s
Tournament places this independence in the crosshairs. By their own
measure, the Tournament system is successful if it exerts a force on
federal judges that causes them to modify their behavior in a way
37. Id. at 300.
38. See id. at 314-15.
39. Id. at 320-21.
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 504-05 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Modern Library
ed. 1937) (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution.”).
41. Id. at 508.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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that brings it more in line with the ranked criteria. They boast that
this will provide a degree of accountability.
In this context, a certain measure of accountability is healthy. We
already require federal judges to comply with ethical rules, subject
them to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, and allow
Congress to control the federal courts’ jurisdiction, budget, and rulemaking authority. But Choi and Gulati’s proposed method for ensuring stellar judicial performance is a horse of a different hue. It not
only conflicts with the Founders’ apparent distaste for perpetual job
evaluation,43 but it also has its roots in a desire for personal advancement. Under the Tournament model, the impulse that spurs
judges to perform to the best of their abilities comes not from a desire
to administer perfect justice but, rather, from a desire to pursue
promotion or indulge in an ego trip. This is not the kind of accountability that we should aim to inculcate.
One response to the admonition that objective measurements will
jeopardize judicial independence is of the “lesser evil” brand—
servitude to the rankings will relieve judges of their existing servitude to politics, so that they no longer will feel the need to modify
their behavior to suit the ideologies of a sitting President. The hope
is that the primary incentive will be to score better on a merit index,
so that the system will reward good performance rather than cynical
politicking. The trouble with this argument is that it presumes—
without an iota of proof—that the new incentive will eliminate the
old one. What is far more likely, however, is that a judge attentive to
her Supreme Court ambitions will be tempted to serve two gods:
ideological purity and the Tournament rankings.
The second response to the judicial independence concern is that
regardless of what motives a Tournament system arouses, one cannot call its incentives pernicious so long as the result—better judicial
performance—is beneficial. According to this thesis, the end justifies
the means: We should not care if judges serve themselves or serve
justice; the only thing that matters is that they produce timely opinions, get cited, and register regular dissents.
With respect, that is smoke and mirrors. Motivation is material
because it is connected to the quality of the judicial product and, consequently, to the strength of the combined indices as a proxy for
merit. As pointed out earlier, incentive-based judicial products may
be of lower quality and, because the Tournament system is not designed to detect lower quality products and treat them differentially,
these incentive-based products quite probably will further erode the
proxy value of the three criteria. Over time, judicial rankings will say
43. See id.
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less about actual merit and more about agility—the ability to game
the system.
The inevitable secondary effect of the Tournament system thus
undermines its primary purpose. The initial impetus for the measurement system is the search for judges who exhibit certain qualities
that comport with the ideal of a jurist who will serve justice well, but
because this is a reward-offering search, a tournament may instead
lead us to judges who, like Pavlov’s dogs, respond well to incentives
and who understand what manipulations will create an apparent
match to that ideal.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF MERIT
ON THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY
If the President and the Senate were to embrace an empirical
ranking system to assist them in their respective nomination and
confirmation responsibilities, other consequences would follow. I focus here on the implications for relations within and between circuits
and the potential impact on the legitimacy of the federal appellate
judiciary.
A. The Effect of Competitive Ranking Systems on Intracircuit and
Intercircuit Relations
It does not take a sophisticated analysis to point out that introducing an assessment system that pushes judges to vie for position
against one another will create potentially unhealthy competitive
pressures. Within circuits, the parade of horribles would look something like this: division of labor would become a constant bone of contention, particularly with respect to the assignment of opinions; the
independence index would spawn superfluous dissents, thereby causing damage both to collegiality and to the rule of law; and the rankings would create an explicit pecking order for an already competitive process of hiring law clerks. In short, this sort of competition
would have unhealthy consequences for the way that we work with
one another.
A second set of consequences would imperil intercircuit relations
and could well lead to the isolation of the law of each circuit. Notably,
the particular quality index that Choi and Gulati have selected to
plug into their composite formula primarily measures “outside citations,” meaning citations by judges from other courts.44 Because the
Tournament ascribes a high value to cross-circuit citation but no

44. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 5, at 71 (stating that the quality
index consists of an adjusted figure representing the number of outside citations for a
judge’s top twenty opinions and the number of invocations).
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value to intracircuit citation, a judge can cite to an intracircuit colleague without increasing her score but may be reluctant to cite an
intercircuit colleague, who is also her competitor. After all, doing so
would give the cited judge a boost in the rankings. This consequence
may discourage citation to opinions from other circuits that, while
not controlling authority, are illuminating and persuasive, even
though such reliance would contribute to uniform development of
federal law. In the worst-case scenario, this undesirable strain on the
conversation between circuits as they encounter novel questions of
law may even encourage artificial circuit splits or uncertainties about
whether circuits agree or disagree on particular points of law.
Another consequence arises from the eventuality that the rankings will generate notions of prestige that attach to the reputation of
the circuit at large. Circuits that do not host a high-ranking Tournament competitor may command less respect or attention from
other judges, lawyers, academics, and clerkship aspirants. Those circuits may then suffer from circumscribed influence on the development of the law. Though effects of this kind are subtle, they are as
difficult to control as they are to detect.
The more general point is that rankings tend to assert a peculiar
power in our society, whereby they come to define our entire perception of the things they measure instead of providing a limited set of
information about those things. And, in practical terms, it is impossible to cabin the influence of rankings to the narrow purpose for
which they were designed.
B. Life at the Bottom and Judicial Legitimacy
Even though ranking systems are inherently relative, they inevitably give rise to labels that quickly become cemented to the name
and reputation of each ranked member. If decisionmakers credit judicial rankings by relying upon them, the public and the legal community may come to perceive a judge ranked at or near the bottom
not just as relatively less productive, less respected, or less independent than his peers but also as a rotten judge. This presumption
of incompetence would emerge regardless of the fact that virtually
the entire membership of the federal appellate bench is first-rate. In
a ranked list, someone has got to wind up at the bottom.
The rankings also could warp the legitimacy of bottom-tier judges.
Low rankings and their attendant consequences may alienate the
judges who receive them. A system that effectively creates a secondclass judiciary could come to define entire careers. I fear that an entrenched ranking system would make it far too easy to forget that
every federal appellate judge has been entrusted by the President
and the Senate to hold the federal judicial power for life.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
One thing can be said with certainty about Choi and Gulati’s
Tournament of Judges: it catapults us into an engaging metaphysical
experiment. In the end, however, I think that it sends us down an
unsightly path. The now-popular spectacle of university hierarchs
scrambling to game the U.S. News and World Report rankings would
caution us to avoid that path.
In my view, the judiciary would do well to keep its pikestaffs at
parade rest and eschew the jousting that Choi and Galuti invite. Objective measures such as they describe are likely to supply information that is only marginally beneficial in a system that performs well
in identifying talented candidates. That information is as likely to
obscure political motives as it is to expose them. Moreover, the suggested measures may be wildly inexact proxies for merit. The gains
that a Tournament would provide are modest at most—and the cost
of them, should they materialize, is the infliction of substantial
harm.
To cinch matters, artificially grafting the proposed measures of
judicial performance onto the current selection process misconceives
the concept of Supreme Court elevation by portraying a Court vacancy as the ultimate reward to which objectively deserving federal
appellate judges are entitled. That is as wrong as wrong can be. We
ought to understand nomination and confirmation as a complex
search for an individual who will best serve the nation at a particular
point in time. Suitability for service on the Court cannot be reduced
to a matter of baseball card statistics. From that perspective, the effort to line up the federal judiciary into tidy rows, ordered exclusively
by a handful of objectively measurable considerations, interferes with
what is a much broader process. What is more, the business of the
federal appellate judiciary is the administration of justice through
the exercise of Article III jurisdiction. As it stands, a Supreme Court
vacancy is an infrequent interruption of that business. Thus, it
makes little sense to advertise the unlikely prospect that political
lightning will strike as a legitimate daily preoccupation for federal
appellate judges. It makes even less sense to hope that federal judges
will indulge in such a distraction.
In the last analysis, federal appellate opinions are not applications for employment on the Supreme Court. Scoring judges as if that
were the endgame takes too narrow a view of a President’s prerogatives while at the same time encouraging the membership of an independent judiciary to subordinate judicial wisdom to the whims of
personal ambition. Objectively speaking, the Tournament proposal
strikes out on its pitch that it will produce merit-based decisionmaking and transparency.
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